The soda tax-the tax on sugary soft drinks as part of health policies to prevent diabetes, including juvenile diabetes-is systematically opposed by Big Food lobbyists.
A study just published in the European Journal of Public Health, the journal of EUPHA published by Oxford University Press, examines the techniques adopted by bubble lobbyists in 11 European countries.
Civil society must organize, to neutralize pressures contrary to public goals. And EUPHA(European Public Health Alliance), at the forefront on this front, explains how to do it. (1)
1) Soda tax in Europe. The study
The survey of lobbying strategies includes all WHO (WHO) member states in the Europe macro-region that had adopted a soft drink tax as of December 2020. Just according to the amount of added sugar that EFSA (2022) has put on the index.
These drinks with poor nutritional profiles, which are also often loaded with additives, increase the risk of obesity, overweight and various other diseases. And WHO itself has called for action, including fiscal measures, to reduce unnecessary sugar and calorie intake. (2)
1.1) Recognition of national policies.
The researchers focused their analysis on 11 countries in the Old Continent. Of these:
– 8 countries where a tax on sugary drinks was already in place at the time of the study. Often also on soft drinks with sweeteners, which, as seen, themselves promote overweight (albeit with different mechanisms), (3)
– 3 States affected by the debate but lacking a soda tax. Estonia, although it approved the tax in 2017 (€0.30/l for drinks with >8% g sugar), did not implement it Norway, after 40 years of implementing the tax (€0.32/l), abolished it in 2021. Finally, Kazakhstan was working on a bill.
** tax is stated in pounds: £0.18/l >5%; £0.24/l >8% sugar
Source : https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckac117
1.2) Excluded countries
Excluded from the study, however, are Poland, which did not activate the soda tax until 2021 (after reconnaissance was completed), Monaco (for having introduced the tax only because of a tax agreement with France) and Italy, ça va sans dire. There where Big Food lobbyists made the sugar tax topic disappear from the political agenda after four years of teasing (4,5,6,7).
1.3) The survey
The researchers administered a questionnaire to politicians, activists and academics/researchers who had closely observed the various legislative processes in the various countries. For the purpose of understanding the dynamics activated by Big Soda.
Only 23 out of 70 experts contacted, however, offered feedback. And no response was received from some of the experts located in 2 of the 11 countries, Finland and Latvia.
2) Obesity Lobby
Almost all respond ents admitted that they had observed ‘interference’, in the soda tax debates, from industrial lobbies. At the forefront are trade associations representing the soft drinks industry (e.g., Assobibe in Italy, UNESDA at the EU level) and the food industry as a whole (e.g., Federalimentare, Food Drink Europe).
Big Soda
then strengthens positions with lobbyists enlisted by individual corporations. ‘The Coca-Cola Company (including local subsidiaries), for example, was mentioned by 14 of the 15 respondents who gave examples of companies opposing a SSB‘(sugar-sweetened beverage)tax, the study authors report.
2.1) Rhetoric of evil
The rhetoric of Big Soda and/or Big Food is based on the same old arguments also used by Big Alcohol and Big Tobacco:
- hypothetical scenario of catastrophic damage to the sector industry and risk of job loss. False, we add. One only has to look at England, where the introduction of the soda tax resulted, quite simply, in the reduction of sugar in drinks, (8)
- individual responsibility. The individual’s freedom of choice should be respected, in antithesis to the idea of the ‘nanny-state‘ (the ‘nanny-state’). A libertarian liberalism where they forget that the damage is then externalized by the real culprit (the Coca-Cola on duty) on public health,
- inequity. The billionaire behemoths with headquarters in tax havens (Ferrero – Esta Thé docet), and their pricey lobbyists, then always allege that they are concerned about the impact of purpose fees on the less affluent sections of society. Combination, precisely those most affected by diabetes and other diseases related to unhealthy diets and unbalanced industrial foods.
2.2) Lobbying strategies. The four building blocks
Lobbying strategies-to prevent the introduction of the soda tax, delay its implementation or denigrate its usefulness once it is in place-are structured on four pieces.
2.2.1) Stakeholders’ building. Coalitions and synergies
The activities of business associations, in the area under consideration, are as effective as they are branched. Giants such as Coca-Cola have direct representation, on this channel, in 11 of the 13 national trade associations.
Issues such as the soda tax then also involve the descent of associations representing the food & beverage industry and industry in general (e.g., Confindustria, Business Europe). Two cases are cited in the study:
- ‘think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, for example, were considered particularly active in the UK.’
- ‘in Ireland, an academic with ties to industry openly opposed the tax in public debate.’
2.2.2) Viral deception
The media–conditioned by conspicuous advertising investments–often offer sides to the media campaigns of Big Soda lobbies. No news unfortunately, not even when defamatory tones are reached against those who promote public health. This study reports cases in the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Portugal, Ireland and Estonia.
Conferences, seminars, and publications are also used to discredit preventive measures (e.g., the soda tax) or highlight its potential negative economic impacts. ‘Food Drink Ireland, for example, worked with analyst firm Creme Global to evaluate the reformulation efforts of Irish food and drink companies and concluded that SSB taxation was unnecessary.’
2.2.3) Intrusion into the political process
‘Leg-splitting’ interventions by Big Soda lobbyists were reported in each country in the study. Eighteen out of 23 of the study participants confirmed that they observed this practice ‘frequently’ or ‘always’. Some examples to follow.
- ‘The ministries of health and finance were primary targets of lobbying, solicited by companies, their business associations or lobbying firms. This is illustrated in the case of the French SSB (Sugar-sweetened beverage, ed.) tax where Coca-Cola and Orangina-Schweppes lobbied officials for a planned amendment, not only directly but also through business associations such as ANIA and lobbying firms such as APCO and Rivington’.
- ‘An Estonian food industry actor has reportedly hired the public relations firm Meta Advisory to lobby against taxation (…); the latter’s website notes that its successes include “avoiding […] excise taxes on soft drinks.”
- In the Irish case, Coca-Cola’s lobbying efforts included a meeting with the Taoiseach (prime minister, ed.) at the 2018 World Economic Forum‘.
2.2.4) Political blackmail and legal action
Political blackmail goes mainstream when the numbers are large. ‘Coca-Cola, for example, reportedly threatened to cancel planned investments in response to SSB’s tax proposals in France and Portugal.’
Another technique adopted against the soda tax is the threat of legal action, nationally and/or supranationally. A couple of examples recorded in the study under review:
- Estonian industry’s vociferation about the supposed unconstitutionality of the soda tax led to the presidential veto on the rule,
- the British Soft Drinks Association had invoked the specter of ‘state aid’ (banned outright in the EU), in favor of products and producers not affected by purpose taxation.
3) How to counter the junk food lobby.
The authors of the research (Lauber et al., 2022)-in addition to analyzing the strategies and tactics adopted by Big Food lobbies against the soda tax-provide some suggestions, to consumer and civil society organizations on how to mitigate its interference. Focusing on three key elements.
Among the factors listed as potentially helpful in preventing or countering industry interference, three stand out.
3.1) Organizing a solid coalition.
Organizing a strong public health coalition is essential to sustain a unified position, with a vibrant social media presence to promote in the media. Unity is strength.
Technical support from researchers, patient associations (including lobbying), the scientific community and organizations such as WHO is very helpful. And it is necessary:
- Provide evidence on the public utility of purpose taxation to debunk narratives to the contrary, as well as
- Convey messages clearly. Recalling, by analogy, the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
3.2) Technical-legal preparation
Policies to tax nutritionally imbalanced foods–e.g., soda tax, sugar tax–must come carefully designed to prevent legal counteroffensives. Some examples:
- the intention to introduce the soda tax,notified by Ireland to Brussels in February 2018, got the green light from the European Commission in just two months, (9)
- the sugar tax introduced by Finland on chocolate and candy was vice versa, in 2016, cassated because it qualified as state aid to producers of other sweets (e.g., puddings and cookies). (10)
3.3) Demand transparency
Widespread opacity about research funding and conflicts of interest, including through donations to ostensibly ‘nonprofit‘ entities, are the order of the day as seen (11,12,13,14). And political interference reaches unimaginable levels, as in the case of senior industrial leaders who participated in the Italian government delegation at a Codex Alimentarius meeting where nutrition information on the label front was discussed. (15)
‘Most countries have no lobbying registers, or they are inadequate anyway. Even in the French and Irish registries, which allow the public to see what policy issues were discussed in the lobbying meetings, there is a lack of information on the amounts spent and the detailed content of the discussions‘, the study authors point out.
#Égalité
Marta Strinati and Dario Dongo
Notes
(1) Kathrin Lauber, Holly Rippin, Kremlin Wickramasinghe, Anna B Gilmore, Corporate political activity in the context of sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy in the WHO European Region, European Journal of Public Health, Volume 32, Issue 5, October 2022, Pages 786-793, https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckac117
(2) Dario Dongo. Taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages, WHO advances while Italy slows down. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade) 11.4.17
(3) Marta Strinati. Zero-calorie sweeteners, paradox effect. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade) 22.4.18 https://www.greatitalianfoodtrade.it/dolcificare/dolcificanti-zero-calorie-effetto-paradosso/
(4) Dario Dongo. Taxation of sugary drinks, WHO advances while Italy slows down. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 11.4.17
(5) Dario Dongo. Tax on sugary drinks in Italy. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 16.11.18
(6) Dario Dongo, Sabrina Bergamini. Sweetened and sugary drinks, sweet snacks. Studies on premature mortality and sugar tax. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade), 10.9.19
(7) Dario Dongo. Revitalization decree, not just FCA and Atlantia. Reverse Robin Hood in the food industry. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 28.5.20
(8) Dario Dongo, Carlotta Suardi. Aranciate, double sugar ration in Italy. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 17.7.18
(9) Press release, European Commission. State aid: Commission clears Ireland’s sugar sweetened drinks tax. 4/24/18 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3521
(10) Confectionery taxes doomed to fail in EU after Finland ruling? Confectioney News. 12/14/16 https://www.confectionerynews.com/Article/2016/12/14/Confectionery-taxes-doomed-to-fail-in-EU-after-Finland-ruling
(11) Marta Strinati, Dario Dongo. Nutrition and health, here’s how Big Food thwarts WHO. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 3.9.20
(12) Dario Dongo, Andrea Adelmo Della Penna. Conflicts of interest in scientific research. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 26.9.20
(13) Marta Strinati. Big Alcohol and a century of science in its service. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 5.11.20
(14) Marta Strinati. Nutrition research diverted by Big Food lobbies. New study. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 27.1.21
(15) Dario Dongo. Codex Alimentarius, the NutriScore and WHO guidelines. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade). 26.9.21. See section ‘CCFLs, government delegations and governance‘.
Professional journalist since January 1995, he has worked for newspapers (Il Messaggero, Paese Sera, La Stampa) and periodicals (NumeroUno, Il Salvagente). She is the author of journalistic surveys on food, she has published the book "Reading labels to know what we eat".
Dario Dongo, lawyer and journalist, PhD in international food law, founder of WIISE (FARE - GIFT - Food Times) and Égalité.
